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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT-A CONTRACT FOR PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT CANNOT BE
TERMINATED AT THE WILL OF THE EMPLOYER IF IT
CONTAINS AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITION TO
THE CONTRARY-Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal.
App.3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972).

In 1959, the plaintiff-employee, Raymond Drzewiecki, executed an employment contract with the defendant, H & R Block,
Inc., a well-known firm engaged in the practice of preparing income tax returns for small taxpayers. The contract provided for
plaintiff to manage a new branch office for defendant. The
agreement stated that the period of employment would be for two
years and that the term would automatically renew from year to
year unless either party gave written notice of termination ninety
days prior to the renewal date. The employer also agreed to give
notice of termination "only in the case of [employee] improperly
conducting the business."'
From 1960 to 1967, the plaintiff-employee increased the
number of branch offices managed by him from one to twentythree.2 The employer then decided that the percentage-of-profits
method used for determining the salaries of its branch managers
should be changed because the salaries were becoming, in the employer's opinion, excessive and unrealistic. The employer proposed a new contract .which would have substantially reduced a
manager's share of the net profits realized from additional growth
in company business. The new contract was to go into effect in
January, 1968.
Plaintiff refused to sign the proposed contract and continued
to perform his duties as manager of his branch office until December, 1968, when the employer terminated the original con1. The specific contract clause was as follows:
13. This agreement shall be for a period of two years . . . and
thereafter shall automatically renew from year to year unless either
party gives written notice of termination 90 days prior to renewal date.
[Employer] may give notice of termination only in the case of [employee] improperly conducting the business. ...
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 700, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
171 (1972).
2. Id. at 700, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
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tract. Plaintiff then sued for, inter alia, breach of contract. 3
The judge, sitting without a jury, found that the contract promised employment to the plaintiff for as long as he properly conducted the employer's business and that it could not be terminated
properly by the employer except for cause. The judge also determined that (1) ten years was a reasonable time for the employment to have continued had it not been wrongfully terminated,
that (2) plaintiff would have earned $60,000 per year during
that period but instead would probably earn only $10,000 per
year, and that (3) plaintiff was damaged by the wrongful termination of his employment contract in the sum of $386,086.75."
Judgment was entered according to these findings and both parties appealed.5 The Court of Appeal, Fifth District, affirmed the
judgment.6 The employer's petition for review to the California
7
Supreme Court was denied.
The primary issue presented for the court's determination
was whether the employer's promise to provide employment for
an indefinite period required separate consideration in addition to
the services to be rendered by the employee.8 Under the terms of
the contract, the employee could have terminated the contract at
will by giving the requisite notice; the employer, however, had
conditioned his right to terminate on the employee's satisfactory
management of the employer's branch office. 9
The defendant claimed that prior California decisions dealing with the issue of permanent employment contracts had uniformly set forth the requirement of separate consideration, in addition to the employee's services, in order to enforce a promise of
permanent employment."
Because of the absence of additional
consideration from the employee, the defendant claimed that he
was free to terminate the employment relationship without liability, notwithstanding the contract clause permitting such action
only in the event of unsatisfactory work by the employee.
3. Id. at 701, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
4. Id.
5. Defendant argued that the contract was for permanent employment and,
because there was no evidence of consideration other than the services to be rendered by plaintiff, that the agreement was terminable at the will of either party.
Plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred in its method of determining damages. Id.
6. Id. at 706, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
7. Interview, Charles H. Brock, defendant's attorney, June 29, 1972.
8. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 173 (1972). For a discussion of the issue of separate consideration,
see Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946).
9. See note 1, supra.
10. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701-02, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 172-73 (1972).
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The court observed that California follows the general rule"
concerning permanent employment contracts which states:
[A]n employment contract purporting to establish a permanent employer-employee relationship through the use of
oblique language is terminable at the will of either party unless it is based upon some consideration other than the em12
ployee's services.
Although California follows this rule, the court pointed out that
it is one of construction, not substance, and held that "[A] contract for permanent employment, whether or not it is based on
some consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be
terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an express
or implied condition to the contrary."' 3
In reaching its decision, the court relied in part on a prior
decision by a federal court of appeals.' 4 That opinion contained
the following language:
If it is their purpose, the parties may enter into a contract for
permanent employment-not terminable except pursuant to
its express terms-by stating clearly their intention to do so,
even though no other consideration than services to be performed is expected by the employer or promised by the employee. . . . [W]here no such intent is clearly expressed
and, absent evidence which shows other consideration than a
promise to render services, the assumption will be thateven though they speak in terms of "permanent" employment-the parties have in mind merely the ordinary business
contract for a continuing employment, terminable at the will
of either party. 15
The decision clearly preserves California's membership in the majority of states'" which follows the general rule that "permanent"
11. On page 702 of the official report, the court discusses the reasoning behind an employer's preference for the general rule but fails to mention an employee's reasons for also supporting the same rule. Such employee support
might be based on the following:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently,
thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition;
indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and
the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself;
and the law will presume . . . that he did not so intend. And if the
contract of employment be not binding on the employee for the whole
term of such employment, then it cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality."
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761
(1932).
12. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 173-74 (1972) (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 704, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (emphasis added).
14. Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
15. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
16. Annot. 135 A.L.R. 646 (1941).
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employment contracts are ordinarily terminable at the will of either party. However, the decision also distinguishes these ordinary contracts from one in which a party forecloses his right to
terminate at will by expressly or impliedly promising not to terminate except for cause. The decision is applicable only to those
agreements in which such an express or implied promise is included; it does not affect employment contracts which provide
only for "permanent" employment and which remain subject to
termination at the will of either party.
The case is helpful in explaining the extent to which a socalled "permanent" employment clause will be enforced. If enforcement of a "permanent" clause is desired, the opinion implies that (1) a provision for separate consideration for the other
party's promise of permanency might be sufficient, or that (2) an
express or implied promise limiting the other party's right to terminate will also suffice. Without meeting at least one of these
two requirements, it is probable that the contract is terminable at
will by either party.
The case makes clear that, in California. the element of separate consideration is not controlling; in its place can be substituted a limitation on the other party's right to terminate the employment contract at will. 17 Provided the parties' intent is clear,
either the separate consideration or the limitation seems sufficient
by itself. Together, however, they would seem unassailable as indicators of the parties' intent to form a truly permanent employment relationship.'8
Lincoln A. Brooks
17. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 704, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 174 (1972).

18. If the employment contract is for personal services, it might be terminable at the will of the employee, the above two requirements notwithstanding,
after a statutory period. In California, the period is seven years. CAL. LABOR
CODE § 2855 (West 1971).

LABOR RELATIONS-GOVERNING BOARD OF SCHOOL
DISTRICT NOT REQUIRED UNDER WINTON ACT TO
BY EMPLOYEE
ALLOW DIRECT PRESENTATION
ORGANIZATION NOT REPRESENTED ON NEGOTIATING
COUNCIL-West Valley Federationof Teachers, Local No. 1953,
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Campbell Union
High School District, 24 Cal. App. 3d 297, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83
(1972).
The West Valley Federation of Teachers, Local No. 1953,
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as West Valley Federation), plaintiff and appellant, was
a certified high school employees' organization which initiated a
mandamus proceeding to compel the Campbell Union High
School District (hereinafter referred to as the District), defendant and respondent, to allow a direct presentation to the governing board of the District. Multiple certificated employee organizations existed within the Campbell Union High School District,
and pursuant to the Winton Act,' a negotiating council had been
formed to represent the organizations. Because the West Valley
Federation was numerically a minority organization, it was not
represented on the negotiating council.
When the West Valley Federation attempted to make a direct appearance before the governing board of the District at its
public meeting, the board refused to hear any matters with respect to which it was required to meet and confer with the negotiating council. The board disallowed requested oral presentations pertaining to such matters without prior consideration by
the negotiating council. Subsequently, the West Valley Federation petitioned for and was granted an alternative writ of mandate
ordering the District to allow direct presentation to the governing
board. The District filed a demurrer and answer to the petition.
The Superior Court, Santa Clara County, Stanley R. Evans, J.,
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and denied requested relief by discharging the alternative writ and denying the
peremptory writ. The West Valley Federation appealed. The
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, affirmed the trial
court judgment.
The major issue in the present case is: Where multiple cer1. CAL EDuc. CODE §§ 13080-13088

1971).

See notes 8-10 infra.

(West 1969), as amended, (Supp.
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tificated employee organizations exist and a negotiating council
has been formed as required by law to represent such multiple
certificated employee organizations, is the governing board of a
school district required by law to hear direct oral presentations by
individual certificated employee organizations? The trial court
answered this question in the negative, and the appellate court
concurred and affirmed the decision. The rationale for the holding is based on the legislative purpose and intent and on the procedures expressed in sections 13080-13088 of the Education
Code.'
Because the major question in this case arises under the
Winton Act, sections 13080-13088 of the Education Code, a
brief review of the statutory provisions of this legislation is required for an understanding of the issue.'
In 1961, the California legislature enacted the Brown Act,
sections 3500-3509 of the Government Code.4 The Brown Act
gave statutory recognition to the labor relations of all public employees as a matter of general public concern, and it emphasized
the right of all employees of state and local governments to join
or not to join employee organizations. School districts and their
employees and employee organizations were expressly included
under the provisions of this act. Four years later, with the adoption of the Winton Act, sections 13080-13088 of the Education
Code, the legislature created separate statutory provisions covering the labor relations of school district employees.'
The purpose of the Winton Act, as expressed in section
13080 of the Education Code," is quite similar to that of the
Brown Act. 7 In the Winton Act, the statement of purpose recognizes the right of public school employees to join organizations
of their own choice and to be represented by such organizations
not only in their professional and employment relationships with
their employers but also in the formulation of educational policy.
2. Id.
3. Berkeley Teachers Ass'n v. Berkeley Fed. of Teachers, 254 Cal. App.
2d 660, 663, 62 Cal. Rptr. 515, 517 (1967).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3509 (West 1966).

5. J. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The MeyersMilias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HAs. L.J. 719, 719-21 (1972).
6. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 states:
It is the purpose of this article to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee relations within the public
school systems in the State of California by providing a uniform basis
for recognizing the right of public school employees to join organizations of their own choice and be represented by such organizations in
their professional and employment relationships with public school employers and to afford certificated employees a voice in the formulation
of educational policy.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500.
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Section 13085 of the Winton Act is the section which is most
significant' in relation to the issue in the present case. The first
paragraph of this section covers "meet and confer" sessions between public school employers or governing boards and representatives of employee organizations within the district.'
The second paragraph of this section indicates that if there
is only one employee organization within a district, the school
board may recognize and bargain with that organization in behalf
of all classified (non-certificated) employees; however, if there is
more than one employee organization representing certificated
employees, the board must bargain with the organizations jointly
through a certificated employee negotiating council composed of
representatives of employee organizations which are entitled to
be represented. 10
8. Section 13081 defines the terms "employee organization," "public
school employer," and "public school employee." Sections 13082-13084, which
parallel sections 3502-3504 of the Government Code, pertain to the rights of public school employees and employee organizations and the scope of representation.
Section 13086 of the Winton Act prohibits interference with individual employees' rights. Section 13087 provides for the adoption of reasonable rules
and regulations for the administration of employer-employee relations. The
final section exempts public school employees from the application of state labor
policy.
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 states:
A public school employer or the governing board thereof, or such administrative officer as it may designate, shall meet and confer with
representatives of employee organizations upon request with regard to
all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee
relations, and in addition, shall meet and confer with representatives
of employee organizations representing certificated employees upon request with regard to all matters relating to the definition of educational objectives, the determination of the content of courses and curricula, the selection of textbooks, and other aspects of the instructional
program to the extent such matters are within the discretion of the
public school employer or governing board under the law. The designation of an administrative officer as provided herein shall not preclude an employee organization from meeting with, appearing before, or
making proposals to the public school employer at a public meeting if
the employee organization requests such a public meeting.
10. CAL. Eeuc. CODE § 13085 further states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 13082 and 13083, in the event
there is more than one employee organization representing certificated
employees, the public school employer or governing board thereof shall
meet and confer with the representatives of such employee organizations through a negotiating council with regard to the matters specified in this section, provided that nothing herein shall prohibit any
employee from appearing in his own behalf in his employment relations
with the public school employer. The negotiating council shall have
not more than nine nor less than five members and shall be composed
of representatives of those employee organizations who are entitled to
representation on the negotiating council. An employee organization
representing certificated employees shall be entitled to appoint such
number of members of the negotiating council as bears as nearly as
practicable the same ratio to the total number of members of the
negotiating council as the number of members of the employee organization bears to the total number of certificated employees of the public
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In the present case, the West Valley Federation is in fact
an employee organization representing certificated high school
teachers employed by the District, but it is only one of a number
of certificated employee organizations in the District. In attempting to make a direct presentation to the governing board of the

District, the organization contends that the Winton Act should be
read so as to draw a sharp distinction between the process of
"meet and confer" and the mere "right of making proposals directly to the school board."
Both the appellant and the respondent rely upon the decision of California Federation of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary
Schools," which also involved mandamus and which " . . . is a

veritable treatise on the history, scope, intent and constitutionality

of the Winton Act."' 2

However, the court determined that the

primary contention of the appellant's argument is not in accord
with the fundamental objective of the Winton Act, as expressed
in the Oxnard decision. 13 As stated in Oxnard, the legislative
purpose of the Winton Act is to create an efficient system for
conducting negotiating sessions between certificated school emschool employer who are members of employee organizations representing certificated employees. Each employee organization shall adopt
procedures for selecting its proportionate share of members of the negotiating council, provided that such members shall be selected no later than October 31 of each school year. Within 10 days after October 31, the members of the negotiating council shall meet and select a
chairman, and thereafter such negotiating council shall be legally
constituted to meet and confer as provided for by the provisions of
this article. Employee organizations shall exercise the rights given by
Section 13083 through the negotiating council provided for in this section.
11. California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969).
12. West Val. Fed'n of Teachers, Loc. No. 1953, v. Campbell Union High
School District, 24 Cal. App. 3d 297, 299, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83, 84 (1972).
13. The court in California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary
Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 534, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497, 513 (1969) declared:
It must be recognized, as the trial court observed, that "the legislature expected that the employment of this medium for negotiation would
effectuate a time saving to the employer in not having to meet and confer separately with two or more employee organizations; would also relieve the employer from having to deal with divergent viewpoints and
to perform the difficult task of weighing and resolving inter-organizational disputes . . .; would eliminate the possibility of an employer
playing one organization off against another and coming up with nothing particularly constructive for the benefit of employees; and, finally,
would better facilitate a continuing and result-securing course of conferring compared with what had been experienced in the past under
the wide open negotiation program featured by occasional concentrated
campaigns and confrontations generated for the purpose of achieving
employment goals .... ." It is not the duty of the courts to evaluate
the wisdom of specific legislation. We must assume that the legislature expected honest, sincere compliance and earnest consideration by
negotiating council members of the minority organization's ideas and
programs, and that if the system is abused, the legislature will amend
or repeal the statute.
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ployees and public school employers. In districts such as Campbell where multiple employee organizations exist, representatives
of these organizations must act through a negotiating council to
"meet and confer" with school district employers on all matters
pertaining to employer-employee relations.
Permitting the West Valley Federation to make a direct presentation to the governing board of the Campbell Union High
School District without first submitting proposals to the negotiating council would not only expressly contradict the intent of the
Winton Act but would also require the governing board of the
District to consider divergent viewpoints and decide policy issues
which could be handled more efficiently by the negotiating council.1'
The decision in Oxnard upholds the constitutionality of the
Winton Act. 15 Although minority organizations may not make
direct presentations to the governing board of the districts, such
organizations are not precluded from presenting proposals to negotiating councils. The Act does not deny individual employees
the right to address the governing board of a school district.
Section 13085 of the Winton Act is especially significant
because it establishes a definite procedure for presenting employee proposals to the school district employers. Under section
13085, in districts where only one employee organization represents certificated employees, an administrator or representative of
the school district holds "meet and confer" sessions with members of the single organization. The sole procedural limitation
imposed by the Winton Act is that in districts where multiple employee organizations exist, all presentations made by certificated
employee organizations concerning employment relations with the
public school employer must be directed through a negotiating
council. Membership on the negotiating council is determined
according to the number of members in each employee organization. Larger organizations are entitled to proportionately greater
representation. Very small organizations may not qualify to
have a representative on the council. Nevertheless, smaller organizations may present proposals concerning employment rights
for consideration by the negotiating council.
14. West Val. Fed'n of Teachers, Loc. No. 1953, v. Campbell Union High
School District, 24 Cal. App. 3d 297, 300, 101 Cal. Rptr. 83, 85 (1972).
15. California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 514, 536, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497, 514 (1969).
The enacted legislation in the present case reconciles the interest of employees in freedom of association in minority organizations with the
governmental interest in dealing effectively with employer-employee relations in the public school system without unconstitutionally suppressing or jeopardizing individual rights.
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Section 13085 contains specific procedures for carrying out
the purpose and intent of the Winton Act. In the present case,
the court correctly determined that the West Valley Federation
must follow established procedures which require that proposals
be presented to the negotiating council and not directly to the
governing board of the District.
The holdings in both West Valley Federation of Teachers
v. Campbell Union High School District and California Federation of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools affirm the validity and constitutionality of the Winton Act. The present case is
significant because it emphasizes the procedural importance of
section 13085 of the Education Code: in all school districts
where multiple certificated employee organizations exist, presentations concerning employer-employee relations must be directed
through negotiating councils composed of representatives of the
organizations. Although individual employees may address the
governing boards of the districts, organizations not qualifying for
membership on the negotiating councils are precluded from making separate proposals and presentations. The holding in the
present case is limited to school districts, but the rationale of the
case might eventually be extended to all public employee organizations presently covered by the Brown Act and subsequent related legislation.
Margaret A. Mulholland

ELECTIONS - LIMITATIONS ON FRANCHISE - DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING
HELD VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995
(1972) and Young v. Gnoss, 7 Cal. 3rd 18, 496 P.2d 445, 101
Cal. Rptr. 533 (1972).
Mr. James Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970,
to assume new employment and on July 1, 1970 attempted to
register to vote in the upcoming August and November elections.
Although he was a bona fide resident of the state and county, Mr.
Blumstein was refused registration because, by election time, he
would not have been a resident of the state for one year and of
the county for three months as required by Tennessee statutes.'
Mr. Blumstein brought a class action in a three-judge federal
court for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the durational residency requirements on constitutional grounds.
The district court panel held that Tennessee's durational residency requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 On direct appeal, the
3
United States Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court reasoned that Tennessee's durational residency requirements divide bona fide residents into two classes based on
the length of time they have been residents and then discriminate
against the new residents as a class by denying them the right to
vote. The question was whether such classification and discrimination is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
In deciding that question, the Court noted that two fundamental rights are infringed by the Tennessee requirement. The
right to vote is denied new residents and the right to travel is
abridged by penalizing recent travelers through restriction of their
franchise. The question of what test shall be applied to decide
whether the challenged statute constitutes a denial of equal protection is determined by the nature of the rights involved. The
right to vote has been characterized as fundamental because it se1. TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-204 & 2-304. These
sections require as a precondition for registration and voting that a resident
have lived within the state for twelve months and within the county for three
months. New residents are those who have not met one or both of these requirements.
2. Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (1970).
3. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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cures all other political rights.4 The right to vote in state elections does not originate from a constitutional grant but is constitutionally protected by the Equal Protection Clause requirement
that all citizens must be allowed to vote on an equal basis.' Similarly, the freedom to travel throughout the United States finds no
explicit mention in the Constitution;" however, that right has long
been recognized as basic to our system of government and impli7
cit in the Constitution.
Because of the fundamental nature and the constitutionally
protected status of these rights affected by the durational residency
requirements, the Supreme Court applied a strict standard to test
the Tennessee statute against the Equal Protection Clause, requiring that the state show the challenged statute is "necessary to promote a compelling state interest."' This case marks the first time
the Court has applied the "compelling state interest" test to durational residency requirements affecting the right to vote in a state
election. In Drueding v. Devlin,9 the Court affirmed a lower
court decision which upheld Maryland's durational residency requirements after testing those requirements against the traditional
equal protection standard of whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible state purpose. 10 However, the
Court's decision in Kramer v. Union Free School District" presaged rejection of the latter test when the Court was again confronted with challenges to durational residency requirements. 2
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
5. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
6. The Supreme Court has based the right to travel at times on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of article IV, § 2 of the Constitution as in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869), and at other times on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the fourteenth amendment as in Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900) and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285-86 (1970) (concurring opinion of Stewart, Burger, & Blackmun, JJ.). In several recent decisions, including the instant case, the Court has been content to reaffirm the existence of the
right to travel without basing it on any particular constitutional provision.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
7. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
8. 405 U.S. at 342.
9. 380 U.S. 125 (1965), aff'g 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964).
10. 234 F. Supp. at 724.
11. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
12. Although it was predictable in light of Kramer that the Court would
apply the compelling interest standard once it agreed to hear a challenge to durational residency requirements, it was not at all clear that the Court would in fact
agree to grant certiorari. Only one year before Dunn, the Supreme Court decided
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), in which it upheld the 1970 Federal
Voting Rights Act eliminating durational residency requirements for voting in
presidential and vice-presidential elections. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black took a hands-off stand on voting requirements for local elections, stating that the power to control non-federal elections was reserved to the
states and the Equal Protection Clause cannot limit that power in the absence of
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In the Kramer case, the Court applied the "compelling interest"
test in holding invalid a statute which required that one be either
an owner of taxable property or a parent of a child in the schools
in order to vote in school district elections. The Court's use of
the same test for a statute which interferes with the right to travel
also followed from an analogous handling of durational residency
requirements for receiving welfare benefits in Shapiro v. Thomp13
son.
Having established the appropriate test of constitutionality,
the Court then looked at the two purposes asserted by Tennessee
for its durational residency requirements to determine if the voting restrictions were in fact "necessary to promote a compelling
state interest."' 4 Tennessee argued that the requirements were
necessary to guard against fraudulent voting by non-residents and
to guarantee that voters are knowledgeable.' 5 The Court recognized a compelling state interest in preventing voting fraud but
decided that durational residency requirements were not a necessary means to that end.' 6 Voter registration requirements accomplish that purpose on an individual basis without the necessity
for a conclusive presumption that all recent arrivals are not bona
fide residents.' 7 Discussing the goal of guaranteeing knowledgeable voters, the Court stated that durational residency requirements
were too imprecise to accomplish such a goal and furthermore,
that Tennessee presented no factual evidence to support its presumption that new voters were uninformed.'
Thus, Tennessee's
durational residency requirements denied residents equal protection of the laws.
The effect of Dunn is to invalidate all one-year state residency and 90-day county residency requirements. However, by
sanctioning, at least in dicta, Tennessee's practice of closing voter
registration 30 days before each election, 19 the Court left open
the question of the validity of residency requirements greater than
30 days and less than 90 days.
other specific constitutional limitations. 400 U.S. at 134-35. Dunn confronted
and invalidated durational residency requirements for voting in non-federal elections squarely contrary to the Oregon dicta. Furthermore, it seems that even
Kramer invaded the prohibited area delineated in Oregon by invalidating re-

quirements for voting in local school district elections.
13.
14.

394 U.S. 618 (1969).
405 U.S. at 342.

15. id. at 345.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 346.

18. Id. at 357-58.
19. The 30-day registration cut-off was not at issue in this case, but the Court

did note that 30 days appeared sufficient from an administrative standpoint.
at 348.

Id.
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Less than two months after Dunn, the California Supreme
Court decided Young v. Gnoss2° in which plaintiffs challenged
California's 90-day county residency requirement for voting and
its 54-day precinct residency and pre-election closing date provision . 2 1 As commanded by the Dunn decision, the California
court held the 90-day requirement unconstitutional and then went
on to test the 54-day requirement by the strict equal protection
standard. The court found that the state had a compelling governmental interest in transmitting voter registration affidavits and
indexes to each precinct by election day, but that the state did not
show that the 54-day period was necessary to accomplish that
task. The court therefore concluded that this requirement was
also unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the California Supreme Court went one step beyond Dunn and held that "[N]o durational residence requirement in excess of 30 days may constitutionally be imposed, and
general voter registration must remain open at all times except
during the 29 days immediately preceding an election."22 The
court based that decision on language in Dunn to the effect that
30 days is ample time for the state to complete its administrative
tasks prior to elections.2" In addition, the court cited a prohibition in the 1970 Federal Voting Rights Act against closing registration more than 30 days before presidential and vice-presidential elections, accompanied by a congressional finding that, as to
presidential elections, any more restrictive registration practice is
not required by any compelling state interest.2 4
These two decisions dictate sweeping changes in the voter
residency laws of a vast majority of the states. No fewer than 48
states have state residency requirements of more than 90 days25
and several have county or district residency requirements longer than the 90-day maximum set by Dunn.2" If the rationale of
the California decision fixing a 30-day residency limit were adopted by the courts of the other states, state residency requirements
in all states, county residency requirements in 32 states and district requirements in 18 states would all be invalid. 7 Such
changes could have a substantial effect on the voting population
20. 7 Cal. 3rd 18, 496 P.2d 445, 101 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1972), cert. denied,
41 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1972).
21.

CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 1, CAL.ELECTIONS CODE § 203 (West 1961).

22. 7 Cal. 3rd at 27-28, 496 P.2d at 452, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
23. 405 U.S. at 348.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(6)(1970).
25.

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

at 40 (1971).
26. Id.
27. Id.

THE BOOK OF THE STATES:

1970-71,
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in our highly mobile society.28 The Bureau of the Census estimates that over five million persons were disqualified from voting
in congressional, state and local elections in 1968 by residency requirements. 29 Thanks to Dunn and Young the number of disenfranchised will be decreased in 1972.
Marian Kennedy Pollack
28. 18.4% of all persons in the United States over age one changed residences
between March 1969 and March 1970, including 3.6% who moved between states
and 3.1% who moved between counties within a state.
OF THE CENSUS,

UNITED STATES BUREAU

THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

at 34 (92 ed. 1971).
29. 115 CONG. REC. 13992-93 (1969)

(remarks of Senator Kennedy).

1970,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE - TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST AND SEARCH ABSENT A VALID WARRANTPeople v. Tenny-25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1st.
Dist. 1972)
On January 24, 1970, officers of the Menlo Park Police Department executed a search warrant issued against Jonathan
Weidman, Robert Garret and "other unidentified persons."
During the search, Carlton Warren Tenny entered the premises
without knocking. Upon observing the activities of the arresting
officers, he attempted to run, but was subsequently apprehended,
searched, and ultimately convicted of violating § 11530 of the
Health and Safety Code1 on the evidence thus obtained. Carlton
Tenny appealed this conviction to the California Court of Appeals' on the basis that the lower court's denial of defendant's
3
motion to suppress is an error of law justifying reversal.
In determining whether the marijuana discovered by the
search pursuant to Tenny's apprehension should be admitted as
evidence, the court first considered whether the defendant was
covered by the original warrant, because of the clause in that
warrant referring to "unidentified persons." The U.S. Constitution stipulates that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."' 4 The defendant contended that the phrase "unidentified
persons" is too broad to be constitutionally valid, as it does not
describe the persons to be searched with suitable particularity.
However, if the phrase is interpreted as the lower court construed
it, to mean "unidentified residents," it is too narrow to cover the
defendant within its scope, as he was not a resident of the premises, nor was he believed to be by the arresting officers.
Since there have been no California cases dealing specifically with the degree of particularity deemed constitutionally sufficient to validate a search of a person, the court considered precedential case standards dealing with the particularity with which
1. Every person who possesses marijuana, except as otherwise provided by
law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not

more than one year . . . or . . .the state prison for a period of not less than one
year. . . or more than 10 years.
2. 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1st Dist. 1972).
3. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West 1970).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend IV, made binding on the states by the 14th amend-

ment according to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
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premises and property must be described, and concluded that the
constitutional requirement is met when the person to be searched
is described with "reasonable particularity."5 The court further
concluded that the phrase "unidentified persons" did not sufficiently meet the standard of "reasonable particularity," and that
the warrant was therefore invalid, as applied to the search of
Carlton Tenny.
The court then dealt with the legality of the search independent of the invalid warrant, recognizing that a search may
properly be made incidental to a lawful arrest." Grounds for arrest include reasonable or probable cause for the arresting officer
to believe that the defendant had committed a felony. In this
case, that probable cause was Tenny's relationship to the furnishing or possession of narcotics. 7 Probable cause was therefore
predicated on the notion that defendant was more than a casual
visitor to premises associated with known narcotics activity,8 and
that the deliberate furtive conduct of defendant under the circumstances supported reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.9
The court noted that the mere presence of the defendant on
the premises did not justify either his arrest or a search of his person, absent additional factors indicating his association with criminal activity. 10 Further, neither defendant's time of arrival nor
his entrance without knocking established probable cause on
which association with the narcotics could be based. The court
observed that nine-thirty at night is not an uncommon time to
call, and that most callers did not knock before entering the premises at 206 San Margarita Ave. The court reasoned, however,
that Tenny's flight from the premises and failure to halt upon
command demonstrated that he had reason to flee from the police, making him more than a casual visitor. This conclusion was
substantiated by the fact that the police were clearly visible from
the door, and that the testimonies of both the defendant and the
arresting officers indicated that the defendant was aware of the
police and ensuing arrests.
The court then concentrated on the "furtive gesture," Ten5. People v. Walker, 250 Cal. App. 2d 214, 220, 58 Cal. Rptr. 495,
499 (1967).
6. People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 402 P.2d 834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1965); People v. Rodriquez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 770, 79 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
7. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 836; People v. Machel, 234 Cal. App. 2d 37, 44
Cal. Rptr. 126 (1965); People v. Rodriquez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 770, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1969).
8. People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1965);
Pierson v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 510, 87 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1970).
9. People v. Gardner, 177 Cal. App. 2d 43, 1 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1960);
People v. Jiminez, 143 Cal. App. 2d 671, 300 P.2d 68 (1956).
10. Pierson v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 510, 521, 87 Cal. Rptr. 433,
439 (1970).
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ny's flight, and evaluated the extent to which it demonstrated the
defendant's association with known narcotics traffic. The court
pointed out that a furtive gesture, in itself, is not sufficient to
justify a search or an arrest." However, the court considered the
incident of flight as "a strong indicia of mens rea, which when
coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the crime," is a proper factor to be balanced in
the officer's decision to make an arrest.12 The "specific knowledge" relating Tenny to narcotics possession consisted of the fact
that narcotics were present on the premises when he arrived, and
that he entered without knocking and attempted to flee upon observation of the police officers. The court then concluded that
the totality of the circumstances constituted probable cause for
defendant's arrest for involvement in narcotics activity. Accordingly, the court held that the search was incident to a lawful arrest, and was therefore proper. 13 The appeal from the order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence was dismissed.
The court's analysis in People v. Tenny pivots on a series of
tenuous observations and conclusions. First, the court finds it
significant that Tenny failed to knock before entering. However,
the record emphasizes that it was the custom of most visitors not
to knock. Police surveillance indicated that out of thirty-two
people entering the house, only five or six were observed to
knock.' 4 The court noted that this fact, standing alone, did not
justify a belief that defendant was more than a casual visitor.
Indeed, the failure to knock is so insignificant that it is remarkable the court considered it at all. It does not demonstrate
that the defendant was more than a "casual visitor," nor does it
indicate that he was involved in narcotics.
More important, however, is the weight given by the court
to the fact that the defendant fled from the scene and failed to
halt on command. The court considers this a "strong indicia of
mens rea, and when coupled with 'specific knowledge' on the part
of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, is a
proper factor to be considered in the decision to make an arThe court seems to imply that the defendant fled berest.""
cause he was fearful that he would be arrested for possession of
narcotics. Further, the officer's knowledge that the defendant
11. People v. Tenny, 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427
(1972). See also People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91

Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1967).
12. People v. Tenny, 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427 (1972).
See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1970).
13. People v. Tenny, 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427 (1972).
See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14. People v. Tenny, 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 26, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419, 426 (1972).
15. Id. at 16, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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was entering a locus of known narcotics activity supposedly implicates him in the crime, to the point of providing probable cause
for his arrest and search. It is precarious logic that the "specific
knowledge" of contraband on given premises will render anyone
who enters upon them subject to arrest upon probable cause.
Once the court established to its satisfaction that the defendant was related to evidence of a crime, it coupled that notion to
defendant's flight as an "indicia of mens rea." The court held
that Tenny's acts could have meant that he fled knowing the men
were police officers, and that his motivation was a matter of conflicting testimony and inference properly resolved by the trier of
fact. However, the court completely neglected the possible motivations of fear, astonishment, or prior experience with police, and
discounted the defendant's own testimony that he believed the men
were robbers.'
This attitude manifests the court's indifference
toward alternative explanations concerning defendant's flighta factor so important to the prosecution as an indicia of mens rea.
The point is that Tenny's thoughts as he fled are not relevant
here, nor were they "properly resolved by the trier of fact." The
court found that Tenny knew the men to be officers, and fled
with the knowledge that he was in possession of marijuana and
would be arrested. The important thing, however, is not what
Tenny actually believed, but how his objective acts could reasonably be interpreted by the arresting officers. Through subjective
analysis, objectively ambiguous acts are construed to be a manifestation of mens rea. A retroactive speculation as to Tenny's
state of mind does not belong in an appraisal of whether the officer had objectively established probable cause for arrest. After
all, the fact that defendant was found to be in possession of narcotics was legally irrelevant to the existence of probable cause, as
probable cause for his arrest and subsequent search cannot be
based on a belated interpretation of conduct which is probable
only in retrospect, through consideration of evidence uncovered
by that search. 1 7 So too, a subsequent determination that Tenny
in fact fled because he was conscious of guilt, is irrelevant to a
determination of the officer's interpretation at the time of the arrest. If there is an innocent explanation of Tenny's acts which
was equally probable at the time the arrest was made, then as a
matter of law, the court ought to have found that no probable
cause existed. Objectively, it would have been just as reasonable
to assume that by virtue of his presence alone, Tenny feared he
would be arrested, properly or not, guilty of crime or not. It is
16. Id.
17. People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955).
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quite possible that Tenny would make an effort to avoid such involvement by flight, merely to avoid the unpleasantness and
stigma associated with police detention.
None of the factors considered by the court, in themselves,
constituted reason to believe that the defendant was more than a
"mere visitor." It therefore appears that the court has combined
a series of factors which are individually devoid of merit to establish probable cause for defendant's arrest. The court has
taken the whole, the "totality of the circumstances," to be far
more than the sum of its parts.
Although the holding does not conflict with the present state
of the law, it stretches the law concerning probable cause for arrest to an absurd degree. A mere furtive gesture does not constitute probable cause for arrest, i" except when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officers relating the suspect to
evidence of crime. Here, defendant was not named in any
search warrant, nor does the record indicate that he was an uncommonly frequent or otherwise special visitor of the premises.
There is no "specific knowledge" on the part of the officer linking defendant to any crime, other than his mere presence and the
fact that he fled, possibly to avoid involvement in what was sure
to be an extremely humiliating and degrading situation. There
was no prior information that defendant was involved in criminal
activity. Equating mere flight with a gesture of guilt or mens
rea falls short of demonstrating that the officers were justified in
concluding that defendant was more than a "casual visitor."
Probable cause to arrest or search must be tested by "facts which
the record shows were known to the officers at the time the arrest (or search) was made."' 19 The only facts known to the arresting officers were that the defendant arrived upon the premises
where criminal activity was occurring, entered without knocking
as was the custom, and fled at the sight of police. These actions
do not, in and of themselves, establish probable cause for arrest,
but merely demonstrate speculation on the part of the arresting
officers that the defendant might have been involved in criminal
activity. Speculation has never been sufficient to justify arrest,
nor should it now be elevated to the status of probable cause.
Because speculation has been equated with probable cause this
holding does not merely demonstrate poor legal reasoning, but
undermines the objective determination of probable cause for arrest, and replaces it with a doctrine of relation back which has no
place in the law of searches and seizures.
Harry Shulman
18. Sibron v. New York, 390 U.S. 40 (1970).
19. People v. Talley, 65 Cal. 2d 830, 423 P.2d 564, 56 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1967).

REAL PROPERTY-COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST RESERVING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY TO A STRANGER
TO TITLE OVERRULED, Willard v. First Church of Christ,
Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, - P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr.
739 (1972).

Genevieve McGuigan owned two abutting lots in Pacifica
known as lots 19 and 20. Lot 19 had a building on it and lot 20
was vacant. Because she was a member of the First Church of
Christ, Scientist, she permitted use of lot 20 for parking during
the services. She later sold lot 19 to Peterson who used the preexisting building as an office and listed the property for resale.
Then Willard expressed an interest in buying both lots 19 and
20, and Peterson signed a deposit receipt for sale of both lots.
At the time he agreed to sell lot 20, Peterson did not own it but
he soon reached an agreement for sale with McGuigan. McGuigan agreed to sell on the condition that lot 20 would continue to
be used as a parking lot for church services. She referred the
matter to the church's attorney who drafted an easement into the
deed to accomplish this purpose.1 Once the clause was inserted
in the deed, McGuigan sold the property to Peterson, who recorded the deed. Willard paid the agreed purchase price and ten
days later he received Peterson's deed for both lots in fee simple.
He recorded the deed, which did not mention an easement for
parking for the church. There is no evidence that Willard was
ever notified about the easement. He did not become aware of it
until several months later at which time he commenced action to
quiet title against the church.
The trial court found that McGuigan and Peterson "intended to convey an easement to the church but that the clause
they employed was ineffective for that purpose because it was invalidated by the common law rule that one cannot 'reserve' an
interest in property to a stranger to title." 2
From the ruling
quieting title in Willard, the Church appealed. In a decision
written by Justice Peters, the Supreme Court of California held
1. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972). The provision in the deed stated the
conveyance was "subject to an easement for automobile parking during church
hours for the benefit of the church on the property at the southwest comer of
the intersection . . . such an easement to run with the land only so long as
the property for whose benefit is given is used for church purposes." Id. at 475,
P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
2. Id. at 476, - P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 741.

344

1972]

RECENT CASES

that absent reliance on the old common law rule that one could
not reserve an interest in property to a stranger to title, such rule
would not be allowed to defeat the grantor's intent to reserve an
easement running to the church in deeding the real property to
Willard.
The Supreme Court rejected Willard's argument that the
easement was defeated by the doctrine of ancient title as not supported by the facts,' and held that the case presented two issues.
First, should the old common law rule barring reservation of an
interest in a third party stranger to title be abandoned? Second, if
the rule were discarded, how could the court best balance two
conflicting interests: the grantor's intent and reliance on the old
rule.
Justice Peters uses this case as an opportunity to abandon
the much maligned, often evaded technical requirements of a
feudal rule, which had already been stricken by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 4 and the Supreme Court of Oregon.' A modern
view was taken by the Restatement of Property as early as 1944.1
"It is an inherent weakness of common law evolutionary
process that its stringent rules of property survive in one form or
another long after the reasons which initially gave them birth
have faded into obscurity." 7 So it was with this rule. Initially,
property rules were extremely rigid, requiring the formal livery
of seisin.8 Later, deeds were used in place of the feudal ceremony and it was necessary to "establish some semblance of order
by promoting uniformity in the instruments of conveyance . . .
When confronted with a choice, the courts sacrificed the intentions of the individual grantors by invoking rules calculated to establish uniformity and necessary limitations and designed to
benefit society as a whole."
Each clause of the deed was of vital importance. It was inevitable that modern courts would relax
enforcement of this rule and realize that there should be fewer
restrictions on the ability to freely alienate property.10
3. Id. at 479, - P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
4. Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
5. Garza v. Grayson, 255 Ore. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970).
6. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 472 (1944) reads as follows: "By a
single instrument of conveyance there may be created an estate in land in one
person and an easement in another."
7. Harris, Reservation in Favor of Strangers to Title, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 127
at 131 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Harris].
8. Id. at 132.
9. Id. at 133.
10. Id. at 134. This trend was formalized in what Harris calls the "Rule of
Intention." Id. The rule states: "If the intent of the parties is apparent from
an examination of the deed 'from its four corners' without regard for its technical and formal division, it will be given effect even though in doing so tech-
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The break with tradition took place slowly and cautiously.
Prior to this opinion, California courts either applied the strict
common law rule or circumvented it or refused to apply it, depending on the particular facts of each case. For example, there
"seemed to be a greater inclination to apply the common law rule
when the interest sought to be reserved [was] only an easement
or similar interest than when it reache[d] the dignity of an estate in land."'" Also, the closer the relation of the third party to
the grantor the more willing was the court to uphold the reserva12
tion as a matter of public policy.
The courts' efforts to safeguard the intentions of the grantor
took many forms. For example, although "[t]heoretically, an
'exception' exists when some part of the ownership of the grantor
is never parted with; while a 'reservation' is a term applicable
when the instrument transfers all the grantor had but creates in
the grantor some specified interest with respect to land transferred,"' a deed with a provision containing what appeared to be
a reservation would be construed as an exception of title in the
grantor. In a California case, Boyer v. Murphy, 4 the court found
that "while the distinction between reservation and exception has
been uniformly recognized the terms 'reservation' and 'exception'
are often used interchangeably; and the technical meaning will
give way to the manifest intent even though the technical term to
the contrary is used."' 5 In Mott v. Nardo'6 the court mentioned
yet another way to approve of the reservation in a stranger. The
court found that although reservation or exception in a deed in
favor of a stranger thereto creates no estate or interest in him, it
may operate as an admission in his favor, an estoppel against the
grantor or an exception from the thing granted. However, in deciding the case, the court reaffirmed the common law rule because it did not conflict with the intentions of the parties.
Perhaps the most significant change of view came down in
1961 in Dandini v. Johnson.'7 In this case, plaintiff had conveyed to her husband her undivided one-half interest in the premnical rules of construction will be violated."

84 A.L.R.2d 1054 at 1063 (1950).

Early California cases which recognized the rule: Barnett v. Barnett, 104 Cal.
298, 37 P. 1049 (1894); Pavkovich v. So. P. R. Co., 150 Cal. 39, 87 P. 1097

(1906); Park v. Gates, 186 Cal. 151, 199 P. 40 (1921); Boyer v. Murphy, 202
Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927); Jacobs v. All Persons, 12 Cal. App. 163, 106 P. 896
(1909); Faivre v. Daley, 93 Cal. 664, 29 P. 256 (1892).
11. Id. at 136.
12. Id.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

6 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 892 (1968) at 224-25.
202 Cal. 23, 259 P. 38 (1927).
202 Cal. at 34, 259 P. at 42.
73 Cal. App.2d 159, 166 P.2d 37 (1946).
193 Cal. App.2d 815, 14 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1961).
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ises described, reserving, however, to herself and to her sister the
right to use and occupy the lands during the terms of their respective lives. The court held the grant was sufficiently ambiguous to
require extrinsic evidence from which they determined that the
effect of the intention was to reserve to plaintiff and her sister the
nonexclusive right to use the property. By including the sister's
rights in the reservation, the court was actually preserving a right
in a third person stranger to title. Thus, the court approved the
modem view that in the construction of deeds, as in the construction of other instruments, the intention of the parties is to be
gathered from the whole document and that such intention shall
govern. This decision was followed by a series of decisions
through the 1960's which took the position that the primary object of the interpretation of a deed is to ascertain and give effect
to the parties' intentions, especially that of the grantor at the time
the instrument was executed.' 8 In practice, the Draconian common law rule against reserving an interest in a stranger to title
has increasingly been ignored in favor of contract interpretation
principles which looked to the intention of the parties. Finally,
in Willard the California Supreme Court has taken a step toward
streamlining the conveyancing procedure by breathing life into
Civil Code § 1066,11 which applies contract principles of construction to land transfers. In doing so, it puts to rest one of the
longest lasting and most stubborn technicalities.
As courts frequently do when seeking to overturn a longstanding rule of law, the Supreme Court seized upon a case in
which the reliance of the grantee upon the old rule was practically
negligible. First, Willard, a man well-versed in real estate sales,
neglected to seek title insurance which would certainly have
pointed up the defect. Therefore, no insurance company could
be said to be relying on the old rule. Second, Willard himself
never searched the record to determine if there was an encumbrance. Since he was on constructive notice of any previously
recorded deed in the chain of title, he can be held to knowledge of
the encumbrance.2" He cannot have been relying on the common law rule because he never read the deed. Willard gave the
California Supreme Court an opportunity to reroute the path of
the common law with no risk of injustice to the parties.
18. Palos Verdes Corp. v. Housing Authority, 202 Cal. App.2d 857, 21 Cal.

Rptr. 225 (1962); People v. Scheinman, 248 Cal. App.2d 180, 56 Cal. Rptr.
168 (1967); Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App.2d 22,
64 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1967).

19. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1066 (West 1970) reads as follows: "A deed of
conveyance is a contract and is subject to the usual rules of construction applicable to such instruments."
20. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1213 (West 1970).
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As to future land sale contracts, the court unequivocally
states that it will follow "the lead of Kentucky and Oregon and
abandon the common law rule entirely."'" However, it tempers
that language by refusing to give the new ruling retroactive effect. Therefore, presently existing deeds will have to be treated
individually.2 2 In other words, the court is giving some weight
to the dissenting opinion in the Townsend case, which was the
first to discard the common law rule:
When a rule of property is abandoned, I believe that past
transactions entered into in reliance upon it should be excluded from the effect of the opinion. Though such an opinion may theoretically constitute nothing more than dictum,
nevertheless it has the useful effect of providing guidance for
future transactions without an ex post facto divestiture of
23
rights heretofore considered to have been settled.
There is no doubt, however, that a revised common law rule has
been stated and that Willard is a valuable precedent for the application of the over-looked Civil Code § 108524 which allows a
valid grant in any natural person.25
Logically, a reservation in favor of a third person should be
operative. "Certainly any rule which can only operate to defeat
grantor's intention is undesirable and should be discarded unless
some overriding public policy requires its retention. ' 26 -In this
case, the California Supreme Court found no such public policy.
James L. Stoelker
21. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal. 3d 473, 478,
-P.2d -, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739, 743 (1972).
22. Id. "Competing interests may warrant application of the common law
rule to presently existing deeds."
23. Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
24. CAL. Civ. CODE, § 1085 (West 1970) reads as follows: "A present
interest, and the benefit of a condition or covenant respecting property, may be
taken by any natural person under a grant, although not named a party thereto."
25. The court states that § 1085 is clearly not applicable in this case because the church is not a natural person.
26. Harris, supra note 7 at 154.

DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND ARSON-CRIME OF ARSON DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC MENTAL STATE
AND THEREFORE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE
MAY NOT BE ASSERTED.-People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App.
3d 925, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972).
William Nance was driving from Santa Rosa to San Francisco with four other men when the car in which they were riding
ran low on gas. They decided to steal fuel from pumps at the
Marin County Airport, but could not do so because the pumps
were electrically operated. Nance and three of his companions
then broke into and entered the airport administration building
with the intent to switch on the pumps. While inside, they took
candy, gum, the emergency transmitter, a tape recorder, and a
record player. Nance was seen setting fire to curtains in the
company's office.
After a trial by jury Nance was found guilty of burglary'
and arson.2 He pleaded diminished capacity as a defense to the
charge of arson, claiming that he suffered from uncontrollable
urges to start fires. The court held that diminished capacity may
not be raised as a defense to a charge of arson. Arson is a crime
which does not require a specific mental state; therefore, a diminished capacity defense is inapplicable.
Nance appealed to the California Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the requirement
of malice in the statutory definition of arson means merely "...
a deliberate and intentional firing of a building, or other defined
structure, as contrasted with an accidental or unintentional ignition thereof; in short, a fire of incendiary origin . . . ."I The
court thus characterized arson as a crime requiring general rather
than specific intent.4
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 1970).
2. Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of
any barn, stable, garage or other building, whether the property of himself or of another, not a parcel of a dwelling house; or any shop,
storehouse, warehouse, factory, mill or other building, whether the
property of himself or of another; or any church, meetinghouse, courthouse, workhouse, school, jail or other public building or any public
bridge; shall, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than 2 nor more than 20 years. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 448a (West 1970).
3. People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925, 930, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269-70
(1972) citing People v. Andrews, 234 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 44 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
(1965).
4. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 930, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
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Justice Brown, writing for a unanimous court concisely and
correctly explained the law of diminished capacity as it is currently construed in California. Beginning with the landmark
case of People v. Wells,' he traced the use of the diminished capacity defense in relation to both homicide and non-homicide
cases. The defense was first established in homicide cases in response to the rigidity of the bifurcated trial system established in
California in 1927.0 Under this system no evidence of defendant's mental condition could be introduced at the guilt stage of
trial. 7 Only after being found guilty could the defendant introduce evidence of his impaired mental condition at the second, or
insanity, phase of the trial. Thus, all pertinent issues, save defendant's sanity based on the "right-wrong test",8 were decided
before expert medical witnesses could be heard. The defendant
was conclusively presumed sane' at the first stage of the trial and
it was virtually impossible for him to dispute any of the mental
elements of the prosecution's prima facie case.
The Supreme Court of California declared in 1949 in Wells
that the defense should be allowed, in the guilt stage of trial, to
introduce testimony relating to the accused's mental condition at
the time of the alleged crime, in order to negate the specific mental state or intent necessary for the particular crime. 10
The Nance court pointed out that in homicide cases the effect of a successful diminished capacity plea is the reduction of
the charge to a lesser included offense. The defense may negate
the requisite malice aforethought and thus reduce murder to
manslaughter;" or lack of premeditation may be shown and re5. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
7. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928); People v. Leong
Fook, 206 Cal. 64, 273 P. 779 (1928).
8. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); People
v. Pico, 62 Cal. 50 (1882). The 1971 proposed revisions to the California
Penal Code provide:
§ 535. Insanity
535. (a) A person is not criminally responsible for an offense if,
at the time of the offense, as the result of mental illness, disease, or
defect, he lacked the capacity to know and understand what he was
doing, or to know and understand his conduct was wrongful and a violation of the rights of another person.
(b) A person raising the defense of insanity, as defined by subdivision (a) of this section, has the burden of establishing that defense
'by a preponderance of the evidence.
THE CRIMINAL CODE:

PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT STAFF DRAFT,

(Joint

Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, 1971).
9. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. at 49, 273 P. at 773; People v. Leong Fook,
206 Cal. at 76-77, 273 P. at 784.
10. 33 Cal. 2d at 346, 202 P.2d at 63.
11. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 928, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 267; accord, People v. Mosher,
1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People v. Waters, 266
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duce first degree murder to second degree. 12
The use of a diminished capacity defense in non-homicide
cases has not been as widely accepted as its use in homicide
cases. 1 3 Despite questions of policy raised in some appellate
cases,' 4 the California Supreme Court has implicitly stated that
the defense is acceptable to negate the specific intent element in
cases of burglary, robbery and rape. 15 The California appellate
courts have recognized a diminished capacity defense in cases of
forgery" and of battery on a police officer. 7 Battery, is considered a general rather than specific mens rea crime, and the
court in People v. Glover pointed out that the defense of diminished capacity is only available when a particular mental
state, such as specific criminal intent, is by statute made an essential element of the crime. Although neither battery" nor battery
on a police officer 2" makes mention of specific criminal intent as
an element of the crime, the court concluded that the statutory
crime of battery on a police officer requires a particular mental
state: the knowledge that the21victim is a police officer engaged in
the performance of his duties.

The issue presented in the instant case was whether arson
qualifies as a crime requiring a specific mental state and is therefore susceptible to a diminished capacity defense. The lower
courts have often disagreed as to whether a particular crime requires a specific or general intent. Justice Traynor provided an
Cal. App. 2d 116, 71 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1968); People v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App. 2d
913, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 91,1,
49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
12. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 928, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 267; accord, People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968); People v. Nicolaus,
65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967); People v. Goedecke, 65
Cal. 2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.
2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
13. The diminished capacity defense is so well established in murder cases
that the appellate court has held that it is proper for the court to give a diminished capacity instruction when the evidence warrants it, even if this is objected to by the defense. People v. Olea, 15 Cal. App. 3d 508, 93 Cal. Rptr.
265 (1971).
14. See, People v. Rodriguez, 272 Cal. App. 2d 80, 76 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1969); People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal. App. 2d 901, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1969).
15. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 392, 461 P.2d 659, 667, 82 Cal. Rptr.
379, 387 (1969).
16. People v. Gentry, 257 Cal. App. 2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1968).
17. People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967).
The Nance court is misleading in its discussion. It cites Glover as a case of
battery, implying a simple battery, when in fact it was a case of battery on a
police officer. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 929, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 242 (West 1970).
19. Id.
20. CAL. PEN. CODE § 243 (West 1970).
21. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 505-06, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
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excellent discussion of this problem in People v. Hood.22 Noting
the artificiality of the distinction between specific and general
mens rea crimes, he pointed out that policy considerations often
23

dictate how a crime is to be classified.
The Nance court's reasoning is founded primarily on policy
grounds. Unlike a homicide case in which successful use of a
diminished capacity defense will merely reduce the charge and unlike an insanity plea which imposes compulsory treatment on the
defendant if successful, a successful defense of diminished capacity to the crime of arson would free the defendant.2 4 Conse-

quently, in determining whether arson requires a specific mental
state, the court defined "malice" when related to the crime of arson as an intentional (as opposed to accidental) firing of a structure.

The Nance court concluded that "maliciously", in the stat-

utory definition of arson, means only "an intent to do a wrongful
act." 25 The court does not view "maliciously" as "a wish to vex,

annoy, or injure another person. ' 26 The court cites to several
appellate cases in which the former definition is used.2 7 In the
first of these arson cases, People v. Andrews,2 a the court reasoned

that " . . . 'malice' denotes nothing more than a deliberate and
intentional firing of a building ....,,29 However, this definition
was not supported by the cases cited by the Andrews court.8 °
In choosing the Andrews definition, the Nance court failed

to consider an earlier and arguably better reasoned definition of
malice than that found in Andrews. In People v. McCree3 1 the
crime of arson 8 2 was distinguished from the crime of injuring a

22. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1970).
23. Id. at 456-58, 462 P.2d at 377-79, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625-27.
24. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 930, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
25. id.
26. "The words 'malice' and 'maliciously' import a wish to vex, annoy, or
injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by
proof or presumption of law. . . ." CAL. PEN. CODE § 7(4) (West 1970).
27. People v. Andrews, 234 Cal. App. 2d 69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1965);
People v. Bowman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 358, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1966); People v.
Williams, 19 Cal. App. 3d 339, 96 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1971).
28. 234 Cal. App. 2d 69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1965).
29. Id. at 75, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
30. The Andrews court cites People v. Clagg, 197 Cal. App. 2d 209, 17
Cal. Rptr. 60 (1961) and People v. Cape, 79 Cal. App. 2d 284, 179 P.2d 426
(1947). In Cape the court merely finds that evidence, though circumstantial,
may be used by the jury to show defendant's criminal intent. The court does
not differentiate as to the type of intent necessary. Id. at 289-90, 179 P.2d at
428-29. In Clagg the court does not discuss the issue of malice but merely states
that "(a)ll that is needed to establish the corpus delecti, in addition to the actual burning, is that the fire was intentional or of incendiary origin." Supra at
212, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
31. 128 Cal. App. 2d 196, 275 P.2d 95 (1954).
32. CAL. PEN. CODE § 448a (West 1970). Arson and related offenses are
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place of confinement .s The former requires that the act be done
"willfully and maliciously"; the latter requires the act be done
"willfully and intentionally." The court in McCree concluded
that "(t)he fact an act was done intentionally or knowingly does
not result in the conclusion that it was done maliciously. .... 3.
'The words malicious and intentionally are not synonymous; nor
does the one include the other. Something more than an intention to do the thing afterwards pronounced as wrong and inexcusable is necessary to constitute malice.'

""

At least in McCree,

malice in the case of arson is construed to involve a particular
state of mind. The court in Nance, while not discussing McCree,
implicitly rejects its analysis not for legal but for policy reasons;
since "a pyromaniac would not, under our present system, be subject to compulsory treatment."3" The court looks to legislative
action to provide an answer to the problems created by a "successful" defense of this nature.
The early proponents of this defense hoped to see the rule
extended to all areas of criminal activity, 7 but the court today
seems to be restricting rather than expanding its scope. The
court in Nance objected to the lack of procedural safeguards in
applying a diminished capacity defense to non-homicide cases
such as arson. 3 1 In these cases a person found not guilty by reason of insanity is subject to commitment if, in the opinion of the
court, he represents a danger to society.39 However, if such a
considered specific intent crimes in the proposed revision to the Penal Code.
PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT STAFF DRAFT (Joint
THE CRIMINAL CODE:
Legislative Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code, 1971), 107-10.
33. Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls
down, or otherwise destroys or injures any place of confinement, is
punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), and
by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, except
that where the damages or injury to any city, city and county or county
place of confinement is determined to be two hundred dollars ($200) or
less, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. CAL. PEN. CODE § 606 (West
1970).
34. 128 Cal. App. 2d at 202, 275 P.2d at 99.
35. Id. citing In re Carncross, 114 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W.D. N.Y. 1953).
36. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 930, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 270. "Policy reasons weigh
in our decision even more strongly than do the technical distinctions between
the general mens rea and specific intent."
37. See, Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 59, 67 (1961).
38. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 930, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970) provides, in part:
If the verdict or finding be that the defendant was insane at the time the
offense was committed, the court unless it shall appear to the court that
the defendant has fully recovered his sanity shall direct that the defendant be confined in the State hospital for the criminal insane, or if
there be no such State hospital then that he be confined in some other
State hospital for the insane. .

.

. A defendant committed to a State

hospital shall not be released from confinement unless and until the
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person is acquitted based upon a diminished capacity defense, he
is freed. Presently, there is no legal basis for restraining him. If
proposed revisions4" to the Penal Code are enacted, a defendant
acquitted under a diminished capacity defense would be subject
to commitment41 similar to a civil commitment under the Lanter42
man-Petris-Short Act.

Even if the legislature enacts these revisions,43 closing the
loopholes indicated by the Nance court, that court's definition of
arson would still preclude the use of a diminished capacity de-

fense.

It is questionable whether legislative inaction should pro-

vide the basis for institutionalizing a judicial definition which, by
court which committed him, or the superior court of the county in
which he is confined, shall, after notice and hearing, find and determine that his sanity has been restored.
40.

PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (Report

of

the Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, 1968), 92.
41. Sherry, Penal Code Revision Project-ProgressReport, 43 CAL. ST. B.J.
900, 916 (1968).
In commenting on the "loopholes" noted by the Nance
court, Sherry concludes,
The draft proposal closes this door to the release of one who may be
dangerous because of his mental condition by giving the court in such
an instance authority to direct an evalution [sic] of defendant's condition as provided in the case of civil commitments under the California
Mental Health Act of 1967. In those cases in which a defendant is
found not guilty as a result of his defense of mental illness, the proposed revision permits release of the defendant, as does the present
law, if the court is satisfied that he has recovered and is no longer
dangerous to others. Like-wise [sic], it permits commitment to an appropriate state institution where treatment in such an agency appears
to be desirable. It also includes procedures for committing such individuals to local custodial care and to probationary supervision. The
court is given broad interlocutory power to permit release under supervision, to require further inquiry and evaluation of the person so released and, if necessary, to require commitment to the Department of
Mental Hygiene where circumstances indicate that the public safety so
requires. Procedural protections are accorded to the person subjected to
these restraints and controls. They are based upon existing statutory
provisions to which have been added appropriate due process safeguards.
42. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5000 et seq. (West 1972).
43. A note of caution, however, to the attorney contemplating a diminished
capacity defense. Under the proposed revisions, a client might face longer incarceration than if he was convicted of the crime for which he was originally
charged.
A conviction of violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 448a (arson) involves a sentence of "not less than 2 nor more than 20 years." Under the proposed revisions to the Penal Code a defendant could be incarcerated for a considerably
longer period than the minimum two year penalty for arson. If, because of a
successful diminished capacity defense, the defendant were committed to the
"care" of the Department of Mental Hygiene he might well be subject
to an
indeterminate commitment either under the proposed revisions of the Penal Code,
PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, (Report of the Joint
Legislative Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code, 1968), 92, or under
the MDSO provisions of the California Code. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§§ 6450-6457 (West Supp. 1970); see, Comment, The MDSO-Uncivil Civil
Commitment, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 169 (1970).
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operation of the doctrine of stare decisis may make it difficult to
change the rule even if the legislature subsequently acts."
Susan G. Tanenbaum
44. The latest publication by the revisors of the Penal Code fails to mention
the commitment procedure in a diminished capacity case as outlined in the
1968 version. Instead it provides for a degree-reduction plan when diminished
capacity is found to have seriously affected the defendant's intent to commit
some specific intent crime. If the trier of fact determines that the defendant had no intent, the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal, but a finding
of lessened intent would be treated as follows:
§ 550. Diminished capacity and self-induced intoxication effect of verdict or finding
550. In any prosecution in which evidence of diminished capacity or self-induced intoxication has been introduced, when the trier of
fact determines that the person has committed a crime requiring a specific intent as the culpable mental state, but also determines that the
person's specific intent was seriously affected by diminished capacity or
self-induced intoxication, or both, the verdict or finding shall so state,
and the court shall, in sentencing the person or otherwise disposing of
the case, reduce the degree of the crime as follows:
(a) When the crime is a felony of the first degree, to a felony of the
second degree.
(b) When the crime is a felony of the second degree, to a felony of
the third degree.
(c) When the crime is a felony of the third degree, to a felony of the
fourth degree.
(d) When the crime is a felony of the fourth degree, to a felony of the
fifth degree.
(e) When the crime is a felony of the fifth degree, to a misdemeanor
of the first degree.
(f) When the crime is a misdemeanor of the first degree, to a misdemeanor of the second degree.
THE CRIMINAL CODE:
PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT STAFF DRAFT, (Joint
Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, 1971), 38-39. The effect of this provision would undoubtedly be compromise verdicts when a diminished capacity defense is utilized. See, Comment, Insanity & Diminished Capacity, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 550, 582-85 (1972).

